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Abstract
Up to the start of the present economic crisis (2008), Europe 
was characterized by a clear trend of convergence in the GDP 
level of European countries, which was able to counterbalance 
the opposite trend in intra-national disparities that took place 
in many countries – namely those with a more recent accession 
to the Union. The economic downturn of the last years, howev-
er, has brought this process of convergence to a halt, mainly as 
a consequence of the tight austerity policies imposed to many 
southern European countries. This evidence, recognized by the 
European Union in the last Cohesion Report (“the crisis has 
reversed the process of convergence of regional GDP per head 
and unemployment within the EU”) brought to the fore the 
relevance of macroeconomic policies in regional development. 
Therefore in this paper, with the help of a newly built macroe-
conomic and regional forecasting model (MASST), the future of 
regional convergence / divergence in the EU is explored 
through four scenarios: a baseline one, recognizing the clear 
break of the crisis and three exploratory scenarios, depicting in 
a consistent way three different “territorial” strategies: 
supporting large metropolises vs. cities of second and third 
rank, vs. peripheral and lagging regions. Interestingly enough, 
the “cities” scenario proves to be at the same time the most 
cohesive and the most expansionary, shedding some doubts on 
the traditional equity/efficiency trade-off through an interme-
diate strategy based on the exploitation of a diffused territorial 
capital. Overall, diverging regional processes are forecasted 
from now to 2030.
Regional convergence, austerity policies, effects of the crisis, regional econometric models, regional scenarios 
Zusammenfassung
Territoriale Szenarien in Europa: Wachstum und 
Disparitäten jenseits der Wirtschaftskrise
Bis zum Beginn der gegenwärtigen Wirtschaftskrise (2008) 
zeichnete sich Europa durch eine deutliche Tendenz zur 
Annäherung im BIP-Niveau der europäischen Länder aus. 
Dadurch konnte die gegenläufige Entwicklung intranationaler 
Missverhältnisse ausgeglichen werden, die in vielen Ländern 
stattfand – vor allem jenen, die erst vor kurzem in die Union 
aufgenommen worden waren. Der wirtschaftliche Abschwung 
der zurückliegenden Jahre hat diesem Konvergenzprozess 
jedoch Einhalt geboten, hauptsächlich infolge der strengen 
Sparpolitik, die vielen südeuropäischen Ländern auferlegt 
wurde. Diese Tatsache wurde auch im aktuellen Kohäsionsbe-
richt der Europäischen Union anerkannt („Die Wirtschaftskrise 
kehrte den langjährigen Trend der Annäherung von BIP und 
Arbeitslosenquote innerhalb der EU um“) und unterstreicht die 
Bedeutung einer makroökonomischen Politik für die regionale 
Entwicklung. In diesem Papier wird – mithilfe eines neu 
aufgestellten makroökonomischen Modells der Regionalent-
wicklung – die Zukunft der regionalen Konvergenz/Divergenz 
in der EU anhand von vier Szenarien erforscht. Ein Basisszena-
rio würdigt die Krise als sauberen Schnitt; drei untersuchende 
Szenarien stellen drei verschiedene „territoriale“ Strategien auf 
einheitliche Weise dar: Unterstützung großer Metropolen 
versus zweit- und drittrangiger Städte versus Rand- bzw. 
rückständiger Regionen. Interessanterweise zeigt sich das 
„Städte“-Szenario als das geschlossenste und gleichzeitig das 
expansionistischste, was – unter Berücksichtigung einer 
Übergangsstrategie, die auf der Ausnutzung eines diffusen 
territorialen Kapitals basiert – Zweifel am traditionellen 
Kompromiss zwischen Gerechtigkeit und Effizienz aufkommen 
lässt. Insgesamt werden Prognosen für unterschiedliche 
regionale Prozesse von jetzt bis 2030 erstellt.
Regionale Konvergenz, Sparpolitik, Auswirkungen der Krise, regiona-le ökonometrische Modelle, regionale Szenarien 
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Introduction1Up to the start of the present economic crisis (2008), Europe was characterized by a clear trend of convergence in the GDP level of European countries, which was able to counterbalance the opposite trend in intra-national disparities that took place in many countries – namely those with a more recent accession to the Union. The inter-national convergence trend found its explanation in the posi-tive effects of the successive enlarge-ments of the Union towards lower-wage country’s, in the development of Europe-an cohesion policies mainly addressed to less advanced countries, and, at the inter-regional level, in the natural process of convergence that in the long term accom-panies the integration process. Develop-ment happens in fact in a concentrated way in its early stages, polarized in a countries’ core area, but subsequently it spreads to more peripheral areas and to weaker sectors (Williamson 1965). The economic downturn of the last years, however, has brought the natural process of convergence to a halt: as also recognized by the European Union in the last Cohesion Report “The crisis has re-versed the process of convergence of re-gional GDP per head and unemployment within the EU. The challenge now is to ensure a prompt return to a strong growth path, especially in the less devel-oped regions and cities” (EC 2013, p. 6).In order to highlight how the future looks like in terms of regional growth and cohesion trends, pure economic theory is 
not sufficient. On the one hand, the tradi-tional neoclassical approach has high-lighted convergence as the main outcome of market forces (Borts, 1960; Borts and Stein, 1964); when this result was 
difficult to be empirically envisaged, con-ditional convergence was prompted, claiming the importance of similar struc-tural characteristics of clubs of regions to achieve convergence (Chatterji 1994; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). On the other hand, the old traditional Keynesian 
1 This paper draws on the work developed by the authors
 for the ESPON ET2050 project. The results and the
 statements are exclusively those of the authors.
theories were stressing the existence of economic mechanisms reinforcing cumu-lative divergence trends (Myrdal 1957; 
Kaldor 1975).But all these theories were developed in the long after-war period of continu-
ous growth, where macroeconomic, fi-nancial and institutional elements played a pro-active role, creating opportunities more than constraints. As we know, the crisis has deeply changed this general context, imposing limits to public debts 
and deficits and tight austerity policies, particularly severe in the case of some southern European countries, not the most developed. In this condition, the use of a forecast-ing growth models can help in providing empirical results that can be interpreted 
as first suggestions for integrations to theories and approaches developed dur-ing the period of economic growth.In fact, the crisis has brought back to the attention of regional economics the role of macroeconomic elements. During the crisis, the previously catching up countries (Italy in the past, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland afterwards) and the New Member Countries in central and eastern Europe strongly reduced their growth trends, and a “reverse conver-gence” trends emerged with evidence. The effects of the crisis emerged through national macroeconomic restrictions; austerity measures “suggested” by the Union to diverging countries set limita-tions on some national economies, con-ditioning the way out of the crisis. This has been particularly relevant in those countries where the stability and growth pact exerts strong pressures on national 
debts and deficits.These effects generated in the macroe-conomic and national spheres, do not hit homogeneously the different regions of a country. For example, the increase in the spread on interest rates among countries that particularly hit the previous catching up countries generated three main mac-roeconomic effects, each involving differ-ent types of regions: a) a forced reduction of public expenditure , with stronger ef-fects on regions with a higher dependency 
on public money; b) an increase in inter-est rates on private loans and bonds, pe-nalizing particularly industrial regions with large shares of SMEs; c) a credit 
crunch as a consequence of the financial intermediaries’ preference to investments on public bonds rather than on the private sector, hitting industrial regions.Therefore, the new macro-economic 
conditions exert an influence not only on national growth patterns but also on re-gional ones, and consequently on the overall European convergence process – 
an effect that was not sufficiently consid-ered in the literature. Differentiated re-gional impacts of the crisis may stem from the industry composition of the re-gional economy in regard to the tradi-tional ‘mix effect’ of the shift-share anal-ysis (Perloff et al. 1960) and/or from the highly differentiated presence of “ter-ritorial capital“ assets (EC 2005; Camag-
ni 2009) and the ability to mobilize pre-viously “untapped” territorial resources. All these elements may contribute to the explanation of the new geography of re-gional resilience (Simmie and Martin 2010), addressing the structural, supply-side characteristics of each region.The aim of this paper is to highlight how the future of European regions will look like under different scenario as-sumptions on territorial policies and of stringent macroeconomic conditions im-
posed by the crisis and by the specific policy response of the Union. The scenar-io building is based on the MASST model (in its third version), a macroeconomic regional growth model merging national macroeconomic, demand-side, elements with regional, bottom-up, supply-side el-ements. 
On the basis of a coherent framework of macroeconomic and cohesion policies, four scenarios are built: a reference sce-nario, in which the present trends are ex-trapolated in the future, and three sce-narios, differentiated on the basis of dif-ferent assumptions on the kind of normative intervention, the size of the EU 
financial effort in structural policies and most of all on the geographical distribu-tion of national and European policies.
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The paper is structured as follows. In sec-tion 2 a brief presentation of the MAAST model is presented. In section 3 the dif-ferent scenarios are depicted. Section 4 presents the results of the baseline scenario, while section 5 contains the three alternative territorial scenarios. Section 6 presents some concluding re-marks.
The MASST model: a short pre-
sentationThe logic of the model is neither that of a pure forecast nor that of a pure fore-sight.2 Our approach can be termed a 
quantitative foresight in that it is the re-sult of three major steps (Capello et al. 2008 and 2011; Capello and Fratesi 
2009). The first involves scenario build-ing whereby an image of the future is constructed on the assumption that a dis-continuity will emerge in the main ele-
ments or driving forces that influence and regulate the system. The second step is to insert these changes into a model of structural relationships which, in a tradi-tional way, links conditional (explanato-ry) variables and dependent variables. 
The qualitative assumptions of the first-step procedure are translated into quan-titative ones linking the expected driving 
forces to specific values of the model’s in-dependent causal variables. The third step involves a simulation procedure leading to a ‘conditional’ forecast of the dependent variables.The aim is not to achieve precise quan-titative values of economic elements; nor, on the other hand, is it merely to provide a qualitative image of what the economic system will look like; the aim is to show 
the main trends and relative behavioural 
paths that will be at work under specific 
assumptions on how the main driving forces of change will evolve. Both the val-ues assigned to the target variables and 
the regional values emerging from the fi-nal results indicate an order of magnitude 
2 On forecasting methodologies see, among others, 
Armstrong 1985, HAwkins 2001, Hendry and Clements 
2001, loomis and Cox 2000. On foresight methodolo-
gies see, among others, EC 2004, miles and keenAn 
2000, UNIDO 2004.
and some relative behavioural classes (high-medium-low increase or decrease), rather than precise quantitative values.From the methodological point of view, the approach consists in three main steps:• a theoretical step identifying the theo-ry behind the relationships in the mo-del and formulating the model itself (in discursive and mathematical terms);• an estimation step of the causal relati-onship model;• a simulation step identifying: a) the driving forces (scenarios) expected to characterise the future development patterns; b) the implications of the scenario assumptions on the future values of independent variables of the model and c) the simulation procedu-re and the production of the economic and territorial outcomes.
The first and second steps have been made by enlarging and estimating once more the new version of the so called MASST 3 model, a macroeconomic re-gional growth forecasting model able to 
produce, under specific assumptions on the main driving forces of change, the ef-fects on regional GDP growth rates for all NUTS2 regions of the old 27 EU member countries. With respect to previous MASST versions, the MASST3 model dif-fers since it endogeneizes the public ex-penditure growth rates, and therefore the effects of macroeconomic trends and pol-icies on regional growth (Capello et al. 2014).MASST (in all its versions) is a model in which regional growth is the outcome of both regional and national factors, be-cause regional growth is the result of the sum of the national component and of the differential growth component:
Δ GDPrt = Δ GDPnt + diffrt (1)
where ΔGPDrt is the growth of regional 
GDP, ΔGPDnt the growth of national GDP, and diffrt the growth differential shift of a region r compared to its nation n, in a certain period of time t.
Therefore, the MASST model comprises a national and a regional sub-model. The national sub-model encompasses all na-tional macroeconomic aspects, which are important to embrace the effects of the crisis. The regional sub-model instead ex-plains the competitiveness (supply side) aspects of growth, taking the territorial capital characteristics into consideration. The two sub-models are not separate but instead interact, so that any shock affec-ting one or more regions impacts on the growth rates of their countries (and of the neighbouring regions through spil-lover effects), while any shock at national level impacts on regions of that country in a heterogeneous way on the basis of their own territorial capital elements.This structure differs substantially from the existing econometric regional growth models, which in general move towards a direct interpretation of abso-lute regional growth either by replicating national macroeconomic models, or by constructing complex systems of equa-tions for each region linking the region to both the national aggregate economy and to the other regional economies through 
input-output technical coefficients.The advantage of the MASST model’s structure is that a strong interconnection between regional and national growth is established: national macroeconomic trends and policies generate an effect on both national and regional growth, but at the same time regional structures and policies affect both regional and national performance in an interactive national-regional manner. This structure allows account to be taken of complex vertical feedbacks between the regional and na-tional economy without imposing a com-plex system of interlinked equations.Estimations of the various equations that compose the MASST3 model con-
firmed the intuition that the structural relationships that hold the economic sys-tem together and its multiple linkages with the territorial system change be-tween ordinary times and the period of crisis. A clear example in this regard is the consumption growth equation: in pe-riods of non-crisis, the marginal propen-
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sity to consume is much lower than in pe-riods of growth, slowing down the Keynesian multiplicative effects. At re-gional level, some structural relation-
ships are influenced by the crisis, like the employment growth equation, which reg-
isters changes in what are identified as the most expansionary sectors. The changes in the relationships among mac-roeconomic and structural economic var-iables have been taken into considera-tion; in the simulation phase, the MASST3 model allows the choice between param-eters estimated in the years of crisis and in ordinary times, on the basis of the as-sumption of the year in which the crisis will end.At regional level, there are two impor-tant aspects that help explain the differ-entiated impact of the crisis on local economies: a region’s industry composi-tion and its settlement structure. The MASST3 model distinguishes between the role of manufacturing and service employment growth in explanation of re-gional differentials, and it considers the degree of industrial specialization meas-ured by the location quotients at 2-digit 
ATECO sectors. This makes it possible to differentiate the effects of a shock of a sector at European level on the basis of the degree of the regional industrial spe-cialization.Moreover, the model includes a region’s settlement structure. The crisis started in 
the financial sector, and in that phase, large urban areas specialized in high-val-ue service functions (like international-
level finance and insurance) were most exposed to the crisis. However, the eco-nomic downturn rapidly involved the real sector through the credit crunch and the consequent shrinking of global demand, and as a consequence generated greater pressure on industry and in general on ‘exposed’ sectors, and cumulatively on the general internal consumption growth and on demand for investments. Areas most exposed to the crisis suddenly be-came industrial areas, specialized in pro-duction functions, where the crisis par-ticularly hit the unemployment rate. For this reason, the dynamics of the urban 
system is endogenized in MASST3. For the same reason, also the regional func-tional specialization is taken into consid-eration in MASST as an element explana-tory of regional differentials. Assump-
tions on the evolution of specific functions in the different types of regions are possible in MASST; regional function-
al specification can explain resilience to the crisis.3The MASST model can produce: i) GDP growth rates (and levels); ii) manufactur-ing, service and total employment growth rates (and levels); iii) population growth rates (and levels), for all EU27. All out-puts can be delivered for different spatial breakdowns: at the EU aggregate level; by country; by groups of countries decided by the modelers; by NUTS2 of all 27 countries; by groups of regions decided by the modelers.
Three alternative territorial 
scenariosThe purpose of the paper is to create ter-ritorial scenarios under different as-sumptions about the main socio-econom-ic driving forces of change that will act in the future, through the help of the MASST 3 model.
In this section we briefly present the qualitative assumptions of the alternative territorial scenarios, and of the baseline scenario, which represents an extrapola-tion of the present tendencies, under the assumption that no change in policies will be implemented up to 2030, and that the general slow economic recovery will start in 2016. In particular, the baseline scenario is based on two assumptions:1. the global socio-economic and demo-graphic trends of the past will conti-nue, and no major change will alter the EU economy. In particular, it is as-
sumed that no significant changes will occur in Europe’s role in the world economy apart from continuation of the present socio-economic trends, which register a decline relatively to 
3	 For	further	specifications	on	the	general	structure	of	
the MASST3 model, see CApello 2007, CApello et al. 
2008, CApello et al. 2011, CApello and FrAtesi 2012, 
CApello et al. 2014.
the emerging areas. Moreover, no ma-jor change is assumed in technology, so that no radical technological jump will take place before 2030. Transla-ting this general framework into as-sumptions is not straightforward. Most of the trends have changed du-ring the crisis; logical assumptions are required on which trends will return to the pre-crisis long-term pattern and which on the contrary will be perma-nently affected by the crisis;2. European economic policies will re-main as they are at present. Since the aim of the paper is to detect the im-pacts of the crisis, no policy reactions to the crisis itself are foreseen. For this reason, the scenario does not imple-ment new policies, and sticks to the present European, national and regio-nal ones. The stability pact targets de-cided by the European Commission 
(3 % of deficit/GDP) will remain the same as in the past. In the case of na-tional policies, the various countries will try to maintain the present effort to achieve balanced national budgets, 
without strong spending and inflation. As regards regional policies, especial-ly those of the European Union which are implemented in the model, the as-sumption is that they will remain as they are: e.g. for EU cohesion policies, the effort and distribution will be the same as in the programming period 2007-2013.
This trend scenario is the benchmark for three alternative territorial scenarios. The latter are based on different, and rather extreme, assumptions on the way territorial policies will be implemented in the future.
A first scenario is the so called “megas” (metropolitan growing areas) scenario. It is a scenario of economic competitive-ness, developed through market forces, implying a privatised welfare system that gives rise to large public resources to re-
pay the financial debt in 2030. In this market driven logic, the budget for cohe-sion policies is reduced, and mainly dis-
tributed according to an efficiency prin-
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ciple; at the same time public and private investments at national levels are con-centrated in large cities, in the so-called “megas”, i.e. on the most dynamic and innovative cities within each country: in other words, on the “national champions”.4A second scenario is the so-called “cit-
ies” scenario. In this scenario, public in-vestments follow a different logic, and in particular that modern spatial develop-ment policies should be designed so as to maximize the capability of single policies to mobilize and “tap” previously “un-tapped” assets of territorial capital, and 
use them in the most efficient ways (Ca-
magni and Capello 2014). As the Commu-nity Strategic Guidelines for Cohesion Pol-icy have rightly and trail-blazing pointed out (EC 2005), the preconditions for de-velopment widely lie in a hugely differen-tiated and scattered endowment of “terri-torial capital”, made up of natural and ar-
tificial specificities, varied settlement structures, cognitive and relational assets at different degrees of complexity and de-velopment. All these elements – especially those that are not yet fully or creatively ex-ploited – represent the assets and poten-tials on which any development strategy should rely. In this logic, the concentration of public and private investment is in sec-ond-rank cities of each country. The actu-al welfare system is reinforced through in-
creased taxation, and the financial debt re-paid in 2050. The budget is maintained for cohesion policies.The last scenario is the so-called “re-
gions” scenario. This scenario is an equi-ty-driven scenario, with a strong social policy framework, starting from a robust 
public welfare system, financed through public expenditure increase, with a con-
sequence of delayed national financial debts repayment beyond 2050. In the 
4 Megas	cities	are	in	fact	defined	as	those	cities	(LUZ	
areas) that are characterized by more than 1 million 
inhabitants.	Cities	are	instead	identified	as	those	LUZ	
areas with a number of inhabitants in a range from 1 
million to 200,000 inhabitants. Regions are those that 
are below the 200,000 inhabitants. In all cases, data 
used	to	define	the	classes	refer	to	2011.	The	proposed	
classification	of	city	size	classes	may	be	questionable,	
but in the absence of a commonly agreed typology this 
organization of the existing size information represents 
a neutral starting point for the empirical analyses.
same logic, the European Union signifi-cantly increases the budget for cohesion 
policies. All European and national finan-cial resources are concentrated in less-developed areas, mostly rural and cohe-sion regions.These qualitative assumptions have been translated into quantitative target 
variables for the MASST 3 model. The fi-nal results of the quantitative scenarios obtained by running the MASST3 model with the assumptions of the baseline sce-nario and of the three exploratory sce-narios are presented in the next section.
A baseline scenario for Europe 
at 2030
Results at national levelTable 1 presents the aggregate results of the average annual growth rates between 2011 and 2030 of GDP, total employment, industrial and service employment, and population, for the 27 EU member coun-tries as a whole. The same results are presented for two groups of countries:• the old (EU15) countries;• the new member states countries, tho-se that joined the EU in recent times (from now on mentioned as New 12 countries).
The aggregate results already depict in-teresting messages:• the baseline scenario registers an 
average GDP growth rate of 1.89 %, which is slightly lower than the long run trend for Europe, because of the slow coming out of the crisis;• the New 12 countries register a slight-ly higher annual average GDP growth 
with respect to the western countries 
(1.93 %), but the limited difference si-gnals that convergence rate toward western countries will decrease;• employment grows at a sustained rate in Europe, meaning that large part of the recovery from the crisis comes from job creation. Part of the recovery, however, also comes from productivi-ty gains, as signalled by the larger in-crease of GDP with respect to emplo-yment;• productivity gains are particularly pre-sent in western countries with respect to the New 12 countries, where GDP growth mostly takes place through em-ployment creation. Despite the negati-ve population growth rates in this part of Europe, labour force is made availa-ble from employees leaving the agricul-tural sector (if Eastern countries’ cont-ribution of agriculture to total GDP 
decreased from 11 % in the 1990 to 
6 % in the 2008, it is still higher than western countries’ one, which is 
around 2.4 % in 2008) and from unem-ployed people returning to work;• productivity gains are limited in New 12 countries mainly for two main rea-sons: i) the traditional reconversion from agriculture to manufacturing ac-tivities that has characterised these countries since the fall of the Iron curtain is now more contained (the 
share of agriculture reached 6 % of total GDP, and therefore the more contained shifts to industrial activi-ties generate more limited producti-vity gains than before); ii) New 12 countries are characterised by a shift 
GDP Totalemployment
Manufacturing
employment
Service
employment
EU27 member countries
Old 15 countries
New 12 countries
1.89
1.88
1.93
1.58
1.53
1.90
1.38
1.48
0.98
1.63
1.54
2.33
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the basis of MASST3 model simulations
Aggregate average annual growth rates between 2011 and 2030
(baseline scenario, in %)
Tab. 1: Aggregate average annual growth rates between 2011 and 2030
baseline scenario
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of employment from manufacturing to services, evidencing a clear new stage of development from industry to services; however, this industrial reconversion does not bring with it gains in productivity, being the new services low-value added services, like commerce;• a more contained positive trend in em-ployment growth accompanies growth 
in western countries. In these coun-tries, contrary to the New 12, an in-crease in productivity is evident, sho-wing a higher GDP growth rate than the one in employment;• an equilibrated increase of both ma-nufacturing and service activities cha-racterises western countries. This sug-gests that a process of reindustrializ-ation will take place in these 
countries, a process that can find ex-planations in lower salaries as a result of the long crisis the crisis, and a slo-wing down in off-shoring processes, especially towards Eastern countries, the latter will more and more suffer from the constant erosion of their re-lative advantage in low labour cost;• in western countries manufacturing increases mostly in traditional manu-
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Map 1: Average regional GDP growth rate in the baseline scenario
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facturing industries, re-launching entrepreneurship of high quality, as the productivity gains suggest.
Results at regional levelAll the results described above are spa-tially differentiated at Nuts2-2010 level, and reported in Map 1, which depicts the annual average regional GDP growth rate in the baseline scenario, showing that: 5
• GDP growth is positive in all European 
regions, with the exception of a very li-mited number regions in southern Eu-rope, where the recovery after the cri-sis is not able to overcome the negati-
ve effects of the crisis in the first years of the period 2011-2030. These re-gions are the rural areas of Greece and Castilla-La-Mancha in Spain;• in terms of GDP growth rate, there is a 
two speed Europe, since regions belon-ging to southern peripheral countries 
grow in general significantly less than northern countries. Southern Europe-
an countries discount the difficult pre-sent conditions on their future evolu-tionary trajectories and their post-cri-
sis growth is insufficient to recover with respect to other countries where the crisis is felt mildly;• the convergence process by New  12 
countries is incomplete – since these countries are only slightly outperfor-ming the Western ones – and is une-ven, since also within the New 12 countries GDP growth rates are diffe-rentiated. Eastern European countries still grow more than the others, but this is not enough to catch up with the GDP per capita levels of the Western countries by 2030;• intra-national regional disparities in-crease in all countries, in New 12 and in Western ones. The regions with the capitals, the regions with the largest cities, and the more central regions at national level generally outperform the regions which are more rural and peripheral at national level. This is 
5 Given the limited space for this paper, the regional 
results on the industrial and service employment 
growth rates that the MASST model provides – though 
extremely interesting – are not included in this work.
especially evident in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, where Sofia, Bucharest and, to a lower extent, Timisoara are winners at the national level; France, where the highest rates are in Paris, Lyon, Tou-louse and Bordeaux; Italy, where the differential between the richer North and the poorer Mezzogiorno increa-ses; Greece, where the three regions with positive growth rates are Attiki, Thessalia and Kentriki Makedonia.
The convergence trend interruptedIn order to formally inspect the conver-gence trends, Theil indices for the whole regional sample have been calculated, thereby identifying within- and between-countries regional GDP variations. The two components and the general Theil in-
dices have been calculated for the whole simulation period, viz. 2012-2030. Re-sults are presented in Figure 1.Figure 1 suggests that indeed the long-run convergence process is severely threatened by the crisis.   Although be-tween countries disparities maintain their decreasing trends, albeit at a much lower pace with respect to the last 15 
years (Fig. 2), within countries dispari-ties are driven upwards by the long-run effects of the current economic slump.6 This upward trend is so strong that it also shifts upwards overall regional dispari-
ties. Thus, an insufficient or incomplete process of convergence between New Member States and Western countries, along with the negative shift of formerly relatively richer countries, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy,7 is matched by an increasing process of con-centration of wealth and resources in capital regions within countries. The si-multaneous process of convergence slow-down and regional concentration implies future cohesion policies will play a major role in steering such process, especially 
in prolonged periods of fiscal cutbacks.
6 It is interesting to remember that always a leap in 
international integration has determined an increase 
in intra national disparities: Mezzogiorno started to 
diverge	exactly	after	1958	(when	the	Rome	Treaty	was	
signed); Spain and Portugal did the same for 15 years 
after accession; eastern countries did after accession. 
In the medium run things may reverse but it is more 
likely	that	some	regions	can	make	it	(as	the	Third	Italy	
in 1970-90) than the more peripheral and lagging 
regions. The entire history of the EU is a history of 
increasing intra-national disparities, by and large.
7	 EUROSTAT	figures	suggest	that	Spain	and	Italy,	in	
particular, moved in the lower 50 % of the per capita 
GDP distribution within the EU27.
THEIL index
Year
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0.08
0.06
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Overall Between countries Within countries
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Overall, between countries and within countries
THEIL indices
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Fig. 1: Overall, between-countries and within-countries Theil indices, 2012-2030
197
Roberto Camagni, Roberta Capello, Andrea Caragliu, Ugo Fratesi: Territorial Scenarios in Europe
Figure 2 shows the between country disparity trends since 1995: while during the periods of deep EU enlargement (1995-2005), between country disparity trends strongly decreased as a result of the positive effects of the enlargement, since 2008 a clear fall in convergence took place, as a slowdown of GDP growth rates of Eastern countries and a drastic fall of GDP growth in Southern countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy).These disappointing results may be quite surprising with reference to the re-gional development literature in Europe, where the reduction of disparities was recognized since many years and often underlined – even if in reality it was de-termined by a convergence among coun-tries and not among regions. But their likelihood increases in the light of the most recent institutional documents and macro-economic debate. In the Commis-sion’s 2014 Report on Cohesion the crisis is indicated as having “been highly dis-ruptive in many parts of the EU” and hav-ing “reversed the long-term trend to-wards a narrowing of regional dispari-ties” (EC 2014, p. 1). Beyond that, since at least 2013, a new consciousness – and 
new evidence - has emerged concerning 
austerity policies and the fiscal compact effects on aggregate growth. The previ-ous persuasion on the virtuous effects of 
fiscal cutbacks in highly indebted coun-tries 8 was overcome by a new evidence 
on some errors of optimism in official growth forecasts with reference to the 
size of the multiplier of fiscal policies: 
forecasts “have underestimated fiscal multipliers, that is the short term effects of government spending cuts or tax hikes on economic activity” and “growth disap-pointment” was found to be “larger in 
economies that planned greater fiscal cutbacks” (Blanchard and Leigh 2013, 
8	 Positive	effects	coming	from	increased	confidence	
were	supposed	to	overcome	the	negative	effects	com-
ing from contraction of public expenditure.
p. 1), such as in the above mentioned countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy.
Results of the three territorial 
scenariosTable 2 presents the annual average GDP growth rate of the baseline and of the three exploratory scenarios, while Table 3 presents the annual average growth rates with respect to the baseline of the three scenarios for what concerns GDP, total employment, and its subdivision be-tween manufacturing and service.The “cities” scenario is the most expan-sionary scenario in terms of GDP, fol-lowed by the “megas” scenario and then by the “regions” scenario, and this holds particularly for western countries, al-though also the New 12 countries show a strong similarity between the “megas” and the “cities” scenarios. The higher ex-pansion of growth in the “cities” scenario 
can be explained by the higher and more 
efficient exploitation in this scenario of territorial capital elements, of local spe-
cificities, present in both large and sec-ond rank cities that allows local econo-mies to achieve higher competitiveness. Development based also on second rank cities implies the existence of an integrat-ed and equilibrated urban system, made 
of efficient second rank cities working 
with first rank cities in providing quality services and allowing the latter to avoid strong diseconomies of scale that can be of detriment to growth. The weak pres-
ence of equilibrated and efficient urban systems in the Eastern countries may ex-plain why these nations register very similar growth rates between the “me-gas” and the “cities” scenarios, being both 
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Fig. 2: Between country disparities: past and future trends
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Tab. 2: Annual average GDP growth rates between 2011 and 2030
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the result of growth based on efficient 
first rank cities. With respect to the base-
line, New  12 countries gain the same from a “megas” and a “cities” scenario, while the western countries have a clear higher advantage from the “cities” sce-nario than from a “megas” scenarios when compared to the baseline.The “regions” scenario tells a different story: European countries as a whole gain less from this scenario than from the baseline scenario. When the average growth rate is divided between western and New 12 countries, the advantage that the latter countries achieve with respect 
to the baseline emerges, confirming that when cohesion policies are reinforced, their effect is visible. However, the “re-gions” scenario is not the one from which the New 12 countries gain the most com-pared to the baseline; both the “megas” and the “cities” scenarios register higher growth rates than the “regions” also for the New 12 countries. This result under-lines the importance of a “competitive-ness” driven attitude, and at the same time reminds the relatively lower effect of cohesion policies when they are not ac-companied by an endogenous effort in moving towards competitiveness. The two combined aspects, cohesion policies from one side, and local competitiveness 
from the other, can probably be the best recipe for growth.When trends in employment are ana-lysed with respect to the baseline (Tab. 3), other interesting messages emerge, namely:• the “megas” scenario registers a hig-her manufacturing than service em-ployment growth rate, and this is par-ticularly true for western countries. This result can be interpreted in light of the higher competitiveness that in the megas scenario is foreseen for high-tech industries;• in the “cities” scenario, service emplo-yment is more expansionary than ma-nufacturing, and this is particularly true for the New 12;• the “regions” scenario is characterised by a higher manufacturing employ-ment growth rate than the other two scenarios in the New 12 countries, while western countries register a hig-her service employment growth rate than the manufacturing one.
These results suggest that each scenario is accompanied by a relative increase of 
a specific industrial profile in each block of countries. The most competitive sce-nario, namely the “megas” scenario, is in favour of a reindustrialization process all 
over, and especially in the western coun-tries, being a scenario based on a re-launch of new technological paradigms, higher rhythm of innovation, higher pro-ductivity linked to an increased share of high-level functions. This is also based on the initial hypotheses on high-value add-ed manufacturing activities, which are as-sumed to face with increasing competi-tiveness the challenge from emerging countries.9The “cities” scenario registers a higher expansion of service employment with respect to the baseline; being a more spa-tially diffused scenario, both population and business services are required all over Europe. In the “regions” scenario, 
the trends in the sectoral profile are dif-ferent between western and Eastern countries; the high social welfare require-ments call for additional population ser-vices in western and eastern countries, 
but the latter benefit from additional co-hesion funds for the re-launch of indus-trial activities.
Evolution of regional disparities 
in the three exploratory scena-
riosFigure 3 presents the Theil indices, meas-uring the trend in regional disparities that accompany the four scenarios. In particular, Figure 3a represents the total regional disparities, while Figure 3b and 3c separate out the trend in disparities among countries (between country dis-parities) and among regions within coun-tries (within country disparities) respec-tively.
The first interesting message is that all four scenarios register an increase in re-gional disparities (Fig. 3a). There are, however, differences between countries with respect to the baseline: the “megas” scenario is the one registering the high-est increase in regional disparities. Cohe-sion and social policies are able to keep the increase in regional disparity caused by the present crisis under control.
9 A more detailed discussion of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the assumptions behind the three 
scenarios	is	available	in	ESPON	(2012).
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In all scenarios, between country dispa-rities decrease (Fig. 3b), while total disparities increase is caused by an in-crease in the within component (Fig. 3c). The “regions” scenario registers a more contained decrease in the between coun-try disparities, and a limited increase in within-country disparities; cohesion po-
licies are therefore more useful to act on core/periphery disparities within a coun-try, rather than being able to increase the catching up of the eastern countries to-wards the western.The most competitive scenario, the “megas” scenario, strongly worsen intra-national disparities, pushing growth 
through the national champions; howev-er, is improves the intra-country dispari-ties, imposing a competitive edge also to eastern countries, that are able to catch-up thanks to their competitiveness poli-cies even more than in the baseline.The most expansionary scenario, the “cities” scenario, registers also the lowest regional disparities among the four sce-narios (Fig. 3a); the disparities among countries decrease the most among the four scenarios (Fig. 3b), while the within country disparities are similar to the baseline (Fig. 3c), being the amount of budget devoted to cohesion policies the same in the baseline and in the “cities”. Moreover, the “cities” scenario has more contained within country disparities than the “megas”. This result can be explained by the fact that the “cities” scenario is ori-ented towards a competitive but spatial-ly dispersed growth, based on the specif-icities and territorial capital elements of each region. Each nation therefore grows not only through its champions, but through equilibrated urban systems, and 
through an efficient exploitation of local territorial assets.Despite the relatively poorer perfor-mance of NMCs in this scenario, catching up countries in Western Europe (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal) host a large number of second-rank cities which ben-
efit the most in this scenario, thus caus-ing the large decrease in between coun-tries disparities shown in Figure 3b.
Sensitivity analysisResults of modelling are always depend-ent on the assumptions made. Therefore, it is very important to inspect the sensi-tivity of the single results to changes in some exogenous assumptions, as, in the multiple interactions happening inside the operational logics of models, some variables may prove much more relevant 
than others in determining the final out-come (and therefore their future as-sumed trend should be more carefully as-sessed).In our exercise, the sensitivity of a Theil index of regional disparities was 
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Fig. 3: Regional disparities (Theil index) for the four scenarios
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tested concerning a list of variables, linked to macro-economic elements or to relevant demand-supply elements like foreign direct investments in New Mem-ber Countries. This last variable did not prove to impact on disparities: even hy-pothesizing a faster growth of FDI after the crisis, the catching-up process of NMCs was not substantially lifted, as 
their direct benefits were counterbal-anced by an increase in imports.Two variables, on the other hand, proved very effective in determining growth potentials of countries (and con-sequently of their regions): namely the 
expected (exogenous) inflation rate of 
NMCs with respect to Old Member Coun-tries and the expected rise in internal av-erage tax rate in countries with a high public debt. As the countries involved, in both cases, are by and large lagging with respect to the European average in per capita GDP, a change in these exogenous 
variables bears a significant impact on the regional disparities index.
In particular, in the first case, a de-
crease in the expected inflation rates in 
Eastern Member countries (from 5 % as-
sumed in the baseline scenario to 3 %) 
keeping equal to 2,5 % inflation rates in Western ones, is likely to generate a bet-ter control of the former group of coun-tries on their external competitiveness, and therefore contribute, through higher exports, to faster catching-up with re-spect to the latter group. This process is well visible in terms of its effects on re-gional disparities in the EU (Fig. 4): be-tween countries disparities would de-crease substantially with respect to what was forecasted in the baseline scenario and consequently, in presence of a persis-tent negative trend in within countries disparities, total disparities would show only a slight increase.This important result could lead us to conclude that this precise variable should be subject to a careful monitoring both by model builders, in order to continu-
ously figure out its most likely future trend and by policy makers, given its strong potential effects on NMCs econom-ic performance.
The second variable inspected in the same way is tax rate in highly indebted countries: a rise of internal tax rates im-
posed by excessive deficits or by EU cons-traints would jeopardise the potential growth of these countries, and conse-quently determine a rise in total dispari-ties (Fig. 5).Both simulations contain important economic policy implications. In order to maintain their growth potentials, Eastern countries have to keep increase in wages at the level of increases in productivity; by the same token, an increase in tax rate in vicious countries would strongly put under severe threat future convergence trends.
ConclusionsThe results of our “constrained foresight” on regional development in Europe up to 2030 may be considered quite surprising, if compared with the traditional debate in the regional development literature which took place in the long period of economic after war expansion. The re-cent crisis has taken to the front new el-ements of a macroeconomic nature that 
were not so influent previously but that are due to determine huge changes in the performance of both countries and re-gions. The catching up process by previ-ously relatively lagging countries, which happened in the period 1960-2000, ac-companied by growing disequilibria in 
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public (but sometimes also private) debts was suddenly stopped by the crisis and by the European austerity policies im-posed to these countries, driving to a re-versal in the previous virtuous process of reduction of regional disparities. Beyond that, important differences in the impact of the crisis on the single European re-gions is increasingly expected: relatively lagging regions are generally more de-pendent on, nowadays contracting, pub-lic expenditure and more sensitive to credit crunch phenomena. And eight years of continuous crisis are due to gen-erate strong structural effects and step-
backs that will be difficult to overcome completely in many countries in the next future.The crisis generated both negative country effects in southern European countries and a lower catching-up pace in Eastern countries, all trends that econometric forecasts indicate that will not be easily overcome in the next future. This result reinforces the role of cohesion policies, even in a period of tight availa-bility of public resources, with the clear role to mitigate the disruptive effects that the economic crisis has (and will contin-ue) to generate on regional disparities.
The second important finding is that a “cities scenario”, which embraces the phi-losophy of supporting second rank city re-gions, highly diffused in Europe and rep-resenting potentially productive areas, 
rich of specific, not fully exploited territo-rial capital assets and un-exploited ag-glomeration economies, results to be the most expansionary and most cohesive sce-nario, looking at the same time to enlarge the development area in relatively ad-vanced regions and to pick the relatively better structured areas, namely urban ar-eas, in lagging regions. In this case, the pa-per advocates in favor of a strengthening of cohesion policies, denying the existence of the assumed, traditional trade-off be-tween cohesion and development goals, if a true place-based policy is followed. The new target should be the largest mobiliza-tion of existing territorial capital assets, and in particular of local excellences, pre-
sent and dispersed in almost all regions, though a bottom-up ‘discovery’ process led by local élites and intermediate bodies, tailored upon the potentials and 
specificities of the single places. The last important result emerges for what concerns Eastern countries’ future growth trajectories. The latter turn out to be strongly dependent on an increase in wages in line with increases in productiv-ity, so to keep their price competitive-ness. By the same token, our results high-light that an increase in tax rate in vicious countries would strongly put under se-vere threat future convergence trends.
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Peзюме
Роберто Каманьи, Роберта Капелло, Андреа Караглиу, Уго 
Фратези
Территориальные сценарии в Европе: рост и различия 
в условиях экономического кризиса
До начала текущего экономического кризиса (2008 г.), Ев-
ропа характеризовалась чёткой тенденцией конвергенции 
в уровне ВВП входящих в неё стран. Это позволило сбалан-
сировать противоположные тренды внутринациональных 
различий, которые имели место во многих странах - осо-
бенно тех, которые были недавно включены в Евросоюз. 
Однако экономический спад последних лет остановил этот 
процесс сближения - и в основном из-за политики строгой 
экономии, навязанной многим странам Южной Европы. 
Этот факт был также признан в последнем докладе Евро-
пейского Союза/Kohäsionsbericht («Экономический кризис 
повернул вспять долгосрочную тенденцию конвергенции 
ВВП и уровня безработицы в пределах ЕС») и под чёркивает 
важность макроэкономической политики регио нального 
развития. В статье с использованием новой макроэконо-
мической модели регионального развития изучается бу-
дущее региональной конвергенции/дивергенции в ЕС на 
основе четырёх сценариев. При этом базовый сценарий ис-
ходит из объективности кризиса, а три исследовательских 
сценария объединяют три различные «территориальные» 
политики, такие как поддержка развития крупнейших го-
родов по отношению к городам второго и третьего ранга 
и городов по отношению к периферийным и отсталым ре-
гионам. Интересно, что «городской» сценарий является са-
мым закрытым и одновременно экспансионистским, что 
- с учётом стратегии перехода, основанной на использова-
нии диффузного территориального капитала - вызывает 
сомнения относительно традиционного компромисса меж-
ду справедливостью и эффективностью. В целом разраба-
тываются прогнозы различных региональных процессов 
до 2030 г.
Региональная конвергенция, политика строгой экономии, послед-
ствия кризиса, региональные эконометрические модели, регио-
нальные сценарии
Résumé
Roberto Camagni, Roberta Capello, Andrea Caragliu et Ugo 
Fratesi
Scénarios territoriaux en Europe: Croissance et disparités 
au-delà de la crise économiqueJusqu’au lancement de la crise économique actuelle (2008), l’Europe s’est caractérisée par une nette tendance à la conver-gence du niveau du PIB des pays européens, qui a pu contreba-lancer la tendance inverse à des disparités intra-nationales ob-servée dans de nombreux pays – à savoir ceux ayant accédé plus récemment à l’Union. Le déclin économique des dernières an-nées, cependant, a interrompu ce processus de convergence, principalement comme conséquence des strictes politiques d’austérité imposées principalement aux pays d’Europe mérid-ionale. Cette évidence, reconnue par l’Union Européenne dans 
son dernier Rapport sur la Cohésion («la crise a inversé le pro-cessus de convergence du PIB régional par habitant et du chôm-
age au sein de l’UE»), a mis en exergue l›importance des politiques macroéconomiques en matière de développement 
régional. Par conséquent, dans cette contribution, avec l›aide 
d›un modèle de prévision macroéconomique et régionale nouvellement conçu (MASST), le futur de la convergence/di-vergence régionale au sein de l’UE est exploré au travers de quatre scénarios: un premier, de référence, reconnaissant la franche rupture de la crise, et trois scénarios exploratoires, dépeignant d’une façon consistante trois différentes stratégies “territoriales”: l’appui au grandes métropoles vs celui aux vil-les de second ou troisième rang vs celui aux régions périp-hériques et aux régions accusant un retard. Il est intéressant 
d’observer que le scénario «des villes» se révèle être en même temps le plus cohérent et le plus expansionniste, jetant le dou-
te sur le compromis traditionnel équité/efficacité par une stra-tégie intermédiaire basée sur l’exploitation d’un capital terri-torial diffus. Dans l’ensemble, des processus régionaux diver-gents sont à prévoir d’ici à 2030.
Convergence régionale, politiques d’austérité, effets de la crise, mo-dèles économétriques régionaux, scénarios régionaux 
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Exploratory scenarios are mostly territorial in nature; therefore, they are not differentiated with respect to most external macroeconomic conditions.
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Understanding territorial governance: 
conceptual and practical implications
lisa Van Well, peteR sChmitt
Abstract    
Much of the policy analysis of spatial planning today focuses on 
governance or multi-level governance in the sense of tracing 
vertical and horizontal linkages and integration of relevant 
stakeholders (particularly from the bottom-up). Thus far, little 
attention has been paid to the more specific territorial dimen-
sions of governance or how knowledge of territorial specifici-
ties and the territorial impacts of various courses of action are 
used in policy- and decision-making. This paper presents the 
conceptual and practical implications of the ‘ESPON TANGO’ 
– project (Territorial Approaches for New Governance). To that 
end a framework of analysis was developed to systematically 
conceptualise, operationalise and explore territorial govern-
ance processes. Some of the main empirical findings from 
twelve case studies across Europe are synthesised along 20 
components of territorial governance. These components are 
representative of the structural and process-oriented facets of 
territorial governance. It will be argued that our analytical 
framework offers various entry points to understand the main 
elements and characteristics of territorial governance and thus 
adds clarity to the debate on what territorial governance is. It 
also offers a more practical access to doing territorial govern-
ance to support practitioners and policy makers at any level to 
promote territorial governance. 
Regular governance, multi-level governance, territorial governance, European spatial policy and planning, analytical framework 
Zusammenfassung
Territoriale Governance verstehen: konzeptionelle 
und praktische Implikationen
Die politische Analyse der Raumplanung konzentriert sich 
zurzeit vornehmlich auf Governance oder Multi-Level-Gover-
nance, insofern sie vertikalen und horizontalen Verbindungen 
und der Eingliederung einschlägiger Interessenvertreter (vor 
allem von unten nach oben) nachgeht. Die genaueren territori-
alen Aspekte der Politikgestaltung fanden bisher wenig 
Beachtung. Auch wie Kenntnisse territorialer Ausprägungen 
und die territorialen Auswirkungen diverser Vorgehensweisen 
in die Politik- und Entscheidungsfindung einfließen, wurde 
noch nicht eingehender untersucht. Dieser Artikel stellt die 
konzeptionellen und praktischen Implikationen des Projekts 
ESPON TANGO (Territorial Approaches for New Governance) 
vor. Zu diesem Zweck wurde ein Analyserahmenwerk für die 
systematische Konzeptualisierung, Operationalisierung und 
Erforschung territorialer Governance-Prozesse entwickelt. 
Einige der wichtigsten empirischen Erkenntnisse aus zwölf 
europäischen Fallstudien werden neben 20 Komponenten der 
territorialen Governance dargestellt. Diese Komponenten 
geben die strukturellen und prozessorientierten Facetten der 
territorialen Governance wieder. Unser analytisches Rahmen-
werk liefert verschiedene Ansätze für ein besseres Verständnis 
der Hauptelemente und Charakteristika der territorialen 
Governance und schafft somit mehr Klarheit in der Debatte 
darum, was territoriale Governance ist. Darüber hinaus bietet 
es Praktikern und Entscheidungsträgern Hinweise zur Praxis 
und Förderung territorialer Governance. 
Reguläre Governance, Multi-Level-Governance, territoriale Gover nance, 
europäische Raumpolitik und -planung, analytisches Rahmenwerk 
